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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COMMERCE CLAUSE-VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN ACT'S CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDY EXCEEDS CONGRESS'S
POWERS TO REGULATE INTERSTATE COMMERCE. United States v.
Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
1. INTRODUCTION
[T]he principle which regulates the existing social relations between the
two sexes-the legal subordination of one sex to the other-is wrong in
itself and now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement; and... it
ought to be replaced by a principle ofperfect equality, admitting no power
or privilege on the one side, nor disability on the other.'
What eerie foreshadowing that the above words, written by John
Stuart Mill over 130 years ago in The Subjection of Women, are still
telling of the social, legal, and political status of women in modern
American culture. While women's rights have greatly expanded in
recent history, as a society we have not yet reached a point where
"perfect equality' exists in any sphere, be it the law, the church, the
school, the workplace, or even the home. In recent years, crimes such
as domestic abuse and rape have been embraced by various law reform
initiatives as civil rights violations, which sparked a g'rassroots effor
to prove to lawmakers and courts that such crimes are driven by
discriminatory personal motivations that merit civil rights protection
for women.' Bias-related crimes, supporters urged, whether they are
committed against people because of their race, sex, religion, sexual
orientation, or disability, are vicious expressions of discrimination that
require federal civil rights protection." In 1994, Congress responded to
the overwhelming national problem of gender-motivated violence by
I. JOHN STUART MiLt. THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN I (Susan M. Okin ed., Hackett
Publishing 1988) (1869).
2. See Sally Goldfarb, The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act:
Legislative History. Policy Implications & Litigation Strategy, A Panel Discussion Sponsored
by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 391, 395 (1995). The
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund established the National Task Force on the
Violence Against Women Act, which was composed of over 1000 organizations and
individuals nationally. See id. Organizations that supported the bill in response to
pressure from women within the groups ranged from the AFL-CIO, the National
Education Association, and the NAACP to the Girl Scouts, the National Gay and
Lesbian Task Force, and Feminists for Life. See id.
3. See Julie Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated Violence: Developing a Meaningful
Paradigm for Civil Rights Enforcement. 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 123 (1999). Ms.
Goldscheid, a senior staff attorney for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund,
represented petitioner Christy Brzonkala in United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740
(2000).
4. See Goldscheid, supra note 3. at 124.
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enacting the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act
("VAWA"), an historic provision that "declare[d] for the first time that
violent crimes motivated by the victim's gender are discriminatory and
violate the victim's federal civil rights."'
This note examines the United States Supreme Court's controver-
sial decision in United States v. Morrison,6 in which the Court struck
down VAWA's Civil Rights Remedy as an unconstitutional exercise
of Congress's authority to regulate interstate commerce under the
Commerce Clause. First, the note discusses the disturbing facts under
which Morrison arose and its tumultuous prior history. The note next
focuses on the historical development of congressional authority to
regulate interstate commerce, and the various tests and standards of
review employed by the Supreme Court in evaluating the limits of the
commerce power. With the powerful precedent of United States v.
Lopez7 in mind, the note shifts to a discussion of modem commerce
clause jurisprudence and the difficulties in reconciling modem
standards with past precedent. Next, the note analyzes the Court's
reasoning in the Morrison opinion, highlighting the starkly opposed
viewpoints of the majority and minority of the Court. In concluding,
this note considers the significance of the holding and what it means
for Arkansas, suggesting that federal bias-related legislation is no
longer sustainable under the Commerce Clause and that state action is
necessary and long overdue.
I!. FACTS
In the fall of 1994, eighteen-year-old Christy Brzonkala enrolled
as a freshman at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
("Virginia Tech").8  On the night of September 21 of that year,
Brzonkala and another female student met Antonio Morrison and
James Crawford, two fellow Virginia Tech students and members of
the college's varsity football team, in the dormitory where Brzonkala
lived.9 The four young people went to a student's room on the third
5. Goldscheid, supra note 3, at 128.
6. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
7. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
8. See Brief of Petitioner Christy Brzonkala at 2, United States v. Morrison. 120
S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29).
9. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 772, 773-74
(W.D. Va. 1996) (granting defendants' motion to dismiss Brzonkala's Title IX claims).
At the time, Brzonkala only knew the first names of the men and that they were football
players. See id. at 774. It was not until five months later that Brzonkala learned the full
486 [Vol. 23
VAWA CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDY INVALID
floor of the dormitory, and after only fifteen minutes of conversation,
Brzonkala's friend and Crawford left the room, leaving Brzonkala and
Morrison alone.' °  Immediately thereafter, Morrison asked Brzonkala
to have sexual intercourse with him, and after she refused him, twice,
Morrison forcibly threw Brzonkala onto a bed, pinned her down, and
raped her." Crawford then returned to the room, and the men took
turns forcing Brzonkala to submit to unwanted vaginal intercourse for
a second and third time that night.'2 Neither of the men used condoms
when they repeatedly raped Brzonkala.
In the months following the sexual assault, Brzonkala became
despondent and reclusive, quit going to class, and attempted suicide. 4
A licensed psychiatrist for Virginia Tech prescribed anti-depressant
medication as treatment, but Brzonkala's efforts at recovery failed, and
she eventually withdrew from the university for the 1994-95 academic
year.1
5
In April of 1995, after learning the identity of her attackers,
Brzonkala filed a complaint against Morrison and Crawford 6 under
Virginia Tech's Sexual Assault Policy. 7  Although the judicial
names of Morrison and Crawford. See id.
10. See id. at 774. See also Brief of Respondent James LaDale Crawford at 1,
United States v. Morrison. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (Nos. 99-5. 99-29).
II. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 774.
12. See id.
13. See Brief for Petitioner Christy Brzonkala at 3, Morrison (Nos. 99-5, 99-29).
Despite the fact that the men failed to use protection. Morrison threatened Brzonkala
after the third rape when he said, "You better not have any fucking diseases." See id.
Then, when Morrison and Crawford finally let Brzonkala leave, Morrison, who was
wearing only his underwear, silently stalked behind Brzonkala until she reached her
dormitory room. See Brief of Respondent James LaDale Crawford at 1, Morrison (Nos.
99-5. 99-29). In the months following the gang rape, Morrison publicly boasted in the
dining hall that he -like[d] to get girls drunk and fuck the shit out of them." See Brief
of Petitioner Christy Brzonkala at 3, Morrison (Nos. 99-5. 99-29).
14. See Brief of Petitioner Christy Brzonkala at 4, Morrison (Nos. 99-5, 99-29).
Initially, Brzonkala told no one what happened to her, however, she confined herself
to her room, failed her classes, and overdosed on thyroid pills. See Brooke A. Masters.
'No Winners'in Rape Lawsuit: Two Students Forever Changed by Case that Went to Supreme
Court, WASH. POST. May 20, 2000, at B I. Brzonkala also changed her physical
appearance, cutting off her long hair. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. &
State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 953 (4th Cir. 1997), rev'd en banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir.
1999), cert. granted sub noma. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. !1 (1999), affd, 120
S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
15. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 774.
16. See id. Brzonkala failed to preserve physical evidence of the rapes, so she
believed that criminal prosecution of the men was impossible. See id. Virginia Tech
never reported the assaults to either the Virginia Tech Police or to the Blacksburg
Police Department. See id.
17. See id. Virginia Tech published the Sexual Assault Policy in its "University
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committee found insufficient evidence to support Brzonkala's
allegations against Crawford, 8 the committee found Morrison guilty of
sexual assault and sentenced him to a one-year suspension from
school.'9 After Morrison lost on appeal to Virginia Tech's Dean of
Students, he threatened to sue the university for prosecuting him under
the little-known Sexual Assault Policy, which was not published in the
Student Handbook.2" Thereafter, the Dean and another Virginia Tech
official personally met with Brzonkala at her home, a four-hour drive
from the university, and informed her that a second hearing was
required under the Abusive Conduct Policy, which pre-dated the
Sexual Assault Policy.2' Although Morrison was found guilty of
"abusive conduct," a lesser charge than sexual assault, the sanction of
a one-year suspension was re-imposed.22  Morrison appealed to the
Senior Vice-President and Provost of Virginia Tech, Peggy Meszaros,
Policies for Student Life 1994-1995" and formally released the policy for student
distribution in July of 1994. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 953-54.
18. See Brzonkala. 132 F.3d at 954. Crawford produced a witness that corroborated
his alibi defense to Brzonkala's allegations. See Masters, supra note 14, at BI.
Crawford was later charged with rape and attempted sodomy for his involvement in a
1996 gang rape of another Virginia Tech woman. See Brief of Petitioner Christy
Brzonkala at 5 n.2. Morrison (Nos. 99-5. 99-29). Crawford pleaded guilty to a lesser
charge of attempted aggravated sexual assault and was sentenced to a year in prison.
See id. However. the court later suspended Crawford's sentence and placed him on a
period of unsupervised probation. See id.
19. See Brzonkala. 132 F.3d at 954.
20. See id. Brzonkala's complaint alleged that Virginia Tech and its counsel knew,
or should have known, that Morrison's due process claim lacked merit under Virginia
law. See id. at 954 n.2.
21. See id. at 954. Although university officials told Brzonkala that the second
hearing was a "mere technicality" to prosecute Morrison under the college's Abusive
Conduct Policy, the second hearing lasted twice as long as the first, and Brzonkala had
to hire legal counsel at her own expense. See id. Unlike Morrison, Brzonkala was given
insufficient notice to produce affidavits or live testimony from her witnesses, so that
evidence was excluded from the second hearing. See id. at 955. In addition, the
university forbade Brzonkala from giving any testimony related to Crawford, so she had
to give an abbreviated, awkward version of the events. See id.
22. See id. at 955. In late November of 1995, a stunned Brzonkala learned from a
newspaper article, and not from university officials, that Morrison was only found
guilty of "using abusive language," despite the fact that he testified to having sexual
intercourse with Brzonkala after she told him "no" twice. See id. The university.
inexplicably altered the charges against Morrison, notwithstanding the Dean of
Students' promise that the second hearing would address the sexual assault charges and
the fact that Morrison had been accused and convicted of sexual assault at the first
hearing. See id. at 954-56. Brzonkala claimed that the procedural shortcomings and the
ultimate outcome of the second hearing were due to the involvement of Virginia Tech's
head football coach as part of a "coordinated university plan" that would allow
Morrison to play football in the 1995 season. See id. at 956.
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who set aside the sanction without notice to Brzonkala." Morrison
returned to Virginia Tech in the fall on a full athletic scholarship.24 In
fear of her safety from previous threats, humiliated by the procedural
biases in the judicial hearings, and outraged by the university's
decision to set aside Morrison's sanction, Brzonkala canceled her plans
to return to Virginia Tech that fall?5
On March 1, 1996, Brzonkala filed an amended complaint against
Morrison and Crawford in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia alleging, among other things, violations of
Title Ill of the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"), 42 U.S.C. §
13981.26 The VAWA cause of action imposes civil liability upon a
person who commits a gender-motivated violent crime." Brzonkala's
complaint also charged the university with violations of Title IX of the
Education Amendment Ace' and with state-law breach of contract
claims;29 those claims were later settled out of court."0 The United
23. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 955. Although Provost Meszaros found sufficient
evidence that Morrison violated the Abusive Conduct Policy, she summarily concluded
that an immediate one-year suspension was excessive compared with sanctions imposed
upon others for violations of that policy. See id. She imposed a deferred suspension
until Morrison's graduation from the university and required that he attend a one-hour
session on acceptable behavior under University Student Policy. See id
24. See id.
25. See id. Brzonkala did not attend college in the fall of 1995. See id. She did
eventually enroll at George Mason University, a 10-minute drive from her parents'
home in Fairfax County, Virginia. See Masters, supra note 14, at BI. Still unable to
deal with the challenges and pressures of being a college student, she dropped out yet
again, stating. "I tried to hang out and party and be in a dorm and have fun. But I had
no desire to be there at all with these kids." Id.
26. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 772. 773
(W.D. Va. 1996) (granting defendants' motion to dismiss Brzonkala's Title IX claims).
The VAWA's purpose is stated as follows:
Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this part under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. as well as
under section 8 of Article I of the Constitution. it is the purpose of this part
to protect the civil rights of victims of gender motivated violence and to
promote public safety. health, and activities affecting interstate commerce
by establishing a Federal civil rights cause of action for victims of crimes
motivated by gender.
42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 1398 1(c) (1994).
28. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 773. Title IX provides in part: "No person in
the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in. be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance...." 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
29. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 776.
30. See Michael Hemphill, Brzonkala, Tech Reach Settlement in Lawsuit-U.S. Supreme
Court Case Will Proceed. ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Feb. 26. 2000, at Al. Under
2001] 489
UALR LAW REVIEW
States intervened to defend the constitutionality of the civil rights
remedy in § 13981.1' The district court dismissed Brzonkala's claims
against Morrison and Crawford, holding that although Brzonkala
successfully stated a claim for a violation of § 13981,32 the VAWA was
an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's power under both the
Commerce Clause3" and the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 4
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded Brzonkala's § 13981 claim,
holding that Congress had authority to enact the VAWA under the
Commerce Clause." The panel deferred to the four years of congres-
sional hearings on the subject:36 The findings gave Congress a rational
basis for concluding that violence against women substantially affected
interstate commerce, and thus the panel upheld the VAWA as a valid
exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause authority." However, the
the settlement agreement. Virginia Tech denied any wrongdoing in the university's
judicial process and agreed to pay Brzonkala $75,000 of her $4.3 million claim in
federal court. See id.
31. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ.. 935 F. Supp. 779. 786 n. I
(W.D. Va. 1996). aJf'd en banc 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999). cert. granted sub nom.
United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999), affd, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
32. See Brzonkala. 935 F. Supp. at 785. Brzonkala's complaint thus withstood the
defendants' motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See
Bronkala. 935 F. Supp. at 801.
33. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power
"[tjo regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes." Id.
34. See Brzonkala. 935 F. Supp. at 801: U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. The
Fourteenth Amendment provides in part, "No state shall ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. The
Enforcement Clause states. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation. the provisions of this article." Id. § 5. (Author's note: The scope of this
note, however, is limited to discussion of the VAWA under the Commerce Clause.
Therefore, the Court's analysis of the Act under the Fourteenth Amendment will not be
addressed. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.]
35. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ.. 132 F.3d 949. 974
(4th Cir. 1997), rev'den banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom. United
States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999), aff'd, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
36. See id. at 973. The following are but few of the detailed and extensive
congressional findings on the economic effects of gender-motivated violence: violence
is the principal cause of injury to women ages 15-44; three out of every four American
women will be victims of violent crimes at some point in their life: a woman is raped
every five minutes: domestic violence costs employers $3 billion annually due to
absence from work. 95% of all victims of domestic violence are women; and the
government spends between $5 to $10 billion annually on medical, criminal justice, and
other social costs of domestic abuse. See id. at 966 (citations omitted).
37. See id. at 973-74. The Supreme Court previously held that the judicial branch
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Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the panel's decision and
affirmed the district court's ruling by divided vote, invalidating §
13981 as unconstitutional. 8
Because the Court of Appeals struck down the VAWA civil
remedy on constitutional grounds,39 the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 40 In accordance with the Court's decision in United
States v. Lopez,4' the Supreme Court held that violence against women
does not "substantially affect" interstate commerce, and therefore its




A. Historical Overview of Congressional Power to Regulate Inter-
state Commerce and the Evolution of Judicial Standards of
Review
The United States Constitution serves as an enumeration of the
powers explicitly granted by the people to their federal government. 3
Chief Justice Marshall defined the power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce as the absolute power to define the rules by which
commerce is to be governed-a power that knows no limitations other
than those prescribed by the constitution itself." However, the United
States Supreme Court recognized that contests and conflicts must arise
in view of our complex federal system, which consists of two compet-
should defer to laws that are carefully considered and passed by the legislative branch.
See id. at 964 (citing Westside Comm. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens. 496 U.S. 226, 251
(1990)). The Court's role in assessing the validity of congressional acts passed under
the authority of the Commerce Clause is confined to determining whether Congress had
a rational basis for inferring that the regulated activity substantially affects interstate
commerce. See id. at 965 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995)).
38. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 821
(4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. I I
(1999), affd, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
39. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2000).
40. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999). The Court consolidated
the cases by petitioners United States and Brzonkala. See id.
41. 514 U.S. 549(1995).
42. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1754.
43. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I, 187 (1824).
44. See id. at 196. In the Chief Justice's own words. "It is the power to regulate:
that is. to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all
others vested in Congress, is complete in itself. may be exercised to its utmost extent,
and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution." Id.
2001]
UALR LAW REVIEW
ing sovereignties with specific, yet sometimes overlapping, powers to
govern the American people."' Professor Tribe describes the
Commerce Clause as both the principal source of Congress's regulatory
powers and an implicit restriction on the states' legislative authority."
Therefore, it is not surprising that Congress's exercise of its commerce
power and the Court's interpretation thereof has changed throughout
the course of American history.47
I. Power Confined to the Direct Regulation of Commerce Itself
The judiciary's early construction of the commerce power related
to the interstate transportation of goods across state lines.48 This direct
regulation of commerce allowed Congress to regulate the national
economy by preventing the states from discriminating against each
other in ways that would fragment the young nation by state lines.49
The blackletter rule was simple to apply If something moved across
state borders, Congress was empowered to regulate it under the
Commerce Clause; but absent interstate transportation, the activity was
outside the scope of the commerce power.5"
During this era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court
utilized a "direct effects" test to set the standard for constitutional
regulation under the Commerce Clause, which only allowed Congress
to regulate an activity if it directly affected interstate commerce.5' The
Supreme Court strictly adhered to its own judicially-created distinction
between manufacture and commerce as the bright line demarcating the
spheres of state and federal control.52 For example, in 1895 the Court
struck down a congressional attempt to prevent monopolies in the sugar
refining industry when it held that the manufacture of goods only had
45. See id. at 204-05.
46. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-4, at 807-08 (3d
ed. 2000).
47. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, §
3.3.1. at 174 (1997).
48. See Anna J. Cramer, Note, The Right Results for All the Wrong Reasons: An
Historical and Functional Analysis of the Commerce Clause, 53 VAND. L. REV. 271, 277
(2000).
49. See id, at 276.
50. See id. at 279.
51. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 47, § 3.3.3, at 181. Charis Mincavage, Title Ill of
the Violence Against Women Act: Can It Survive a Commerce Clause Challenge in the Wake
of United States v. Lopez?. 102 DICK. L. REV. 441,449(1998).
52. See TRIBE. supra note 46, § 5-4. at 810-11 I; Joseph R. Biden. Jr.. The Civil Rights
Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A Defense. 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 17 (2000).
[Vol. 23
VAWA CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDY INVALID
an indirect and incidental effect on commerce. 3  Although the end
result of manufacture was movement in interstate commerce, the Court
viewed the manufacture/commerce distinction as vital in maintaining
the integrity of state autonomy from federal control in matters of
internal police power.'
The Court reached a similar result in a 1935 case, A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States," when it held that intrastate transactions
could only be federally regulated if they had a "close and substantial
relation to interstate traffic" that resulted in a direct effect on the
movement and flow of goods across state lines. 6  In summary, the
Court confined congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to
the direct regulation of the transportation of goods across state lines
and the regulation of activities that directly impeded the free flow of
goods in interstate commerce."
2. Power Expanded to Encompass Activities That Indirectly Affect
Interstate Commerce
The New Deal era witnessed an expansion of congressional power
to regulate activities that only indirectly affected interstate commerce,58
and marked the beginning of the Court's highly deferential approach
to Congress's commerce power. 9 The Court's landmark decision in
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.60 held that
local, intrastate activities could be reached by Congress if it considered
the regulation of those activities necessary to remove burdens and
obstructions from interstate commerce itself.6' The Court refused to
examine "direct and indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum" and
recognized that local industrial activities could be so closely related to
interstate commerce as to make them urgent matters of national
concern.62  This decision allowed Congress to regulate intrastate
manufacturing activities previously out of its reach because prejudicial
53. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co.. 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895). But see National
Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
54. See id. at 13.
55. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
56. See id. at 543-46.
57. See TRIBE. supra note 46, § 5-4, at 810-1I.
58. See TRIBE, supra note 46, § 5-4, at 812.
59. See Cramer. supra note 48, at 280.
60. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
61. See id. at 37.
62. See id. at 41.
2001]
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intrastate practices nevertheless had a detrimental effect on interstate
commerce.63
3. The "Substantial Effects" Test and the "Rational Basis" Standard
of Review
The Court reaffirmed congressional authority to regulate intrastate
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce in United States
v. Darby." The Court stated, "[t]he motive and purpose of a regulation
of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon
the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and over
which the courts are given no control." 5  When Congress itself had
made a determination that the regulated activity had a substantial
impact on interstate commerce, the courts' only function was to
evaluate whether the means employed by Congress were adopted in
furtherance of the recognized federal power to regulate that
commerce.' Thus, the Darby Court's decision built the foundation for
the rational basis standard of review when it held that Congress was
empowered to enact legislation when it reasonably believed that the
regulation would favor the national economy."7
The most sweeping application of the foregoing principles
occurred when the Court allowed federal regulations pertaining to the
interstate sale and transportation of wheat to restrict the amount of
wheat a small farmer could grow and consume for his own personal
use." The Court held that while individual instances of the regulated
activity may only have a trivial and indirect effect on interstate
commerce, the aggregate effects of local activities could substantially
obstruct commerce and could therefore be subject to federal
regulation.6' Thus, because the aggregate effect of homegrown wheat
63. See CHEMERINSKY. supra note 47. § 3.3.4, at 188, Cramer, supra note 48, at 280.
64. 312 U.S. 100, 119(1941).
65. Id. at 115.
66. See id. at 120-21. However, Congress may not use a relatively frivolous impact
on commerce as a justification for broad general regulation of intrastate or private
activities, only when a general regulatory scheme has a substantial connection to
commerce will the trifling character of individual cases arising under the statute be
ignored. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968).
67. See Mincavage. supra note 5I. at 449.
68. See Wickard v. Filbum. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). The Court recognized that the
application of the federal regulation to the appellee farmer meant that Congress could
regulate an activity that was not itself commercial or interstate in nature. See id. at 125.
69. See id. at 127-29.
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consumption could substantially affect the price and market conditions
of wheat nationally, the federal regulations applied to the local farmer.7"
After twenty years of applying the substantial effects test in
Commerce Clause cases, the Court finally articulated the rational basis
standard of review in Katzenbach v. McClung." This case involved the
constitutionality of the public accommodations provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited discrimination or segregation on
the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin in places of public
accommodation if their operation affects commerce.' The heated
political and social climate surrounding the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 created intense external pressure on the Supreme Court to
uphold the law as constitutional.7 The Court examined the congressio-
nal hearings on the Act and found that the information available to
Congress gave it a rational basis for concluding that racial discrimina-
tion in restaurants created a national burden on interstate commerce. 74
The Court reasoned that the cumulative effects of racial discrimi-
nation in restaurants on interstate commerce, though trivial in any one
case, rendered federal regulation an appropriate exercise of the
commerce power." The Court reiterated that "even if [a regulated]
activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it
may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce .. 76 Because
Congress itself determined the negative effects of racial discrimination
on commerce, and the record showed a rational basis for that conclu-
70. See id. at 128-29.
71. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). "[Wihere we find that the legislators. in light of the facts
and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme
necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end." Id. at 303-04.
72. See id. at 298. Specifically, the Act governs restaurants if they serve interstate
travelers or if a substantial portion of the food served has moved in interstate
commerce. See id.
73. See Cramer. supra note 48, at 282-83.
74. See McClung, 379 U.S. at 299-300. The congressional record included
testimony regarding the reduced per capita spending of African Americans in
discriminatory areas of the country, especially in the South. See id. at 299. The
Attorney General testified that racial discrimination in restaurants artificially
constrained the market and prohibited the free flow of goods. See id. at 299-300.
Further. there was much evidence before Congress that this type of discrimination "had
a direct and highly restrictive effect upon interstate travel by [African Americans]." Id.
at 300.
75. See id. at 300-02.




sion, the legislation was easily held to fall within federal control as a
regulation of interstate commerce."
In addition, the Court explicitly deferred to congressional wisdom
in the legislative sphere and declared that if Congress acted without
expressly violating constitutional limitations, "it has been the rule of
this Court, going back almost to the founding days of the Republic, not
to interfere.' '8  However, this sweeping language represented a broad
expansion of federal power to regulate local activities even if they only
had a distant or merely speculative link to interstate commerce.
79
Specifically, Congress used its expansive Commerce Clause power to
nationalize criminal laws that were formerly within the exclusive police
powers of the states.80
The Court sustained federal regulation of intrastate criminal
activity under the Commerce Clause in Perez v. United States,"' holding
that a federal prohibition on loan sharking was within Congress's
power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate com-
merce.82  Opponents to Title II of the Consumer Protection Act
expressed concern that the federal government was moving to regulate
general criminal law via a national police power that was impermissi-
ble under our federal system. 3  However, Congress eventually
determined that loan sharking was linked to a national ring of orga-
nized crime and that the problem was simply too large to be handled by
the states alone, and the Court once again deferred to the judgment of
Congress." Formal findings, which the Court said were unnecessary
precursors to legislation, nevertheless gave Congress a rational basis
for its conclusion that the economic, financial, and social aspects of
loan sharking in organized interstate crime required a federal solution. 5
Because the regulation passed the rational basis prong of the substantial
effects test, the Court affirmed the petitioner's conviction under the
federal statute.!
77. See McClung, 379 U.S. at 303-04. The Court upheld the public
accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as they applied to hotels the
same day it handed down the McClung decision, utilizing the same rational basis
approach. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
78. McClung, 379 U.S. at 305.
79. See Cramer. supra note 48, at 283.
80. See id. at 283-84.
81. 402 U.S. 146(1971).
82. See id. at 156-57.
83. See id. at 149-50.
84. See id. at 150, 154.
85. See id. at 156-157.
86. See id. at 157.
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B. The Rehnquist Court and the Reining in of Congressional Com-
merce Clause Power: Ambiguity Persists Even After United
States v. Lopez
In the 1995 case of United States v. Lopez,8" the Supreme Court held
that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, a federal criminal statute,
exceeded congressional authority under the Commerce Clause because
it neither regulated a commercial activity nor did it contain a jurisdic-
tional requirement that a particular instance of gun possession be linked
to interstate commerce."" The Lopez decision was a distinct departure
from earlier Commerce Clause jurisprudence because the Court, for the
first time in almost sixty years, invalidated as unconstitutional a federal
law passed pursuant to Congress's commerce power.89 Because the
Lopez decision was the most recent case dealing with congressional
authority to regulate intrastate activities that substantially affected
interstate commerce, it formed the basis for the Court's analysis in
United States v. Morrison" and will be discussed in detail in the follow-
ing subsections. However, it is important to note that Lopez did not
expressly overrule any of the Court's prior Commerce Clause deci-
sions, leaving ambiguous standards for the courts to muddle through in
the application of the decision to future cases9'
I. The Regulation of Intrastate Activities That Substantially Affect
Commerce-Has a Bright Line Been Drawn to Limit Congressional
Authority to Purely Economic Activities?
In Lopez, the Court determined that the Gun-Free School Zones
Act was an attempt by Congress to regulate an intrastate activity-the
possession of firearms in school zones--that had a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.92  In examining past precedent, the Court
maintained that it had only sustained congressional acts regulating
intrastate activity when the Court had concluded that the regulated
activity substantially affected interstate commerce.9  This reasoning,
however, stood in conflict with the Court's prior decisions that when
87. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
88. See id. at 55 1.
89. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 47, § 3.3. 1, at 174; Biden, supra note 52, at 14.
90. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
91. See Cramer. supra note 48, at 285.
92. See Lope:, 514 U.S. at 559.
93. See id. at 559-60.
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Congress itself made that determination, the Court need only look for
a rational basis to support that conclusion.' Instead, the Court stated
that "[w]here economic activity substantially affects interstate com-
merce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained." 5  The
Gun-Free School Zones Act regulated a criminal activity that was not
part of a larger, economic regulatory scheme, and the Court concluded
that the regulation could not be upheld on the basis of the activity's
aggregate effects on commerce because the transactions were not
commercial in nature'
Critics argue that a judicially created "bright line" between
commercial and noncommercial activity is inconsistent with the spirit
of the commerce power.97 Congressional authority to regulate interstate
commerce includes the power to regulate obstructions to commerce
that may not themselves be economic in nature if the effects on
commerce therefrom are substantial:" Senator Joseph Biden, the
sponsor of VAWA, stated that "[a] bright line between commercial and
noncommercial activities not only would elevate form over substance,
but would prove no more workable than the old distinctions between
'direct' and 'indirect' effects, or between 'manufacturing,' 'produc-
tion,' or 'mining,' on the one hand, and 'commerce,' on the other."99
Nevertheless, the Lopez Court focused on the non-economic character
of the intrastate regulation in invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones
Act and rejected the Government's argument that the possession of
firearms in school zones could substantially affect interstate commerce
in the aggregate."°
2. The Hazy Requirement of an Express Jurisdictional Element: Is It
Necessary to Link the Individual Regulated Activity to Interstate
Commerce?
The Lopez Court further denounced the Gun-Free School Zones
Act because it did not contain an express jurisdictional component that
would link a particular case of firearm possession to interstate
94. See supra Section A(3).
95. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (emphasis added).
96. See id. at 561.
97. See Biden. supra note 52, at 17.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 17-18 (citations omitted).
100. See Lope., 514 U.S. at 567. However, the Court never expressly held that
congressional regulatory authority was limited to economic or commercial activities.
See TRIBE. supra note 46, § 5-4. at 823.
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commerce.'0' The Court contrasted the Act with a statute considered
in a previous case that did directly link the possession of a gun to
interstate commerce.'02  Because the scope of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act was not limited to instances where the firearm had a direct
connection to interstate commerce, the Court struck it down as an
impermissible exercise of the commerce power."3
However, previous decisions have downplayed the significance of
an express jurisdictional element so long as the regulated activity, in
general, had a substantial impact on commerce. For example, the 1927
case of Westfall v. United States'" dealt with a violation of the Federal
Reserve Act, and the fact that the statute applied to all violations,
regardless of whether the federal reserve banks experienced a financial
loss, was irrelevant.0" The Court stated: "[W]hen it is necessary in
order to prevent an evil to make the law embrace more than the precise
thing to be prevented it may do so."'" Similarly, the Fair Labor
Standards Act at issue in Maryland v. Wirtz, °7 which set minimum wage
standards, was held to universally apply to all employees of commer-
cial enterprises, even if the particular employees did not work in
manufacture, production, or commerce themselves."°" Therefore, the
Lopez requirement of an express jurisdictional element departed from
previous case law in that it requires an explicit link to commerce in
each instance of the federally regulated activity, instead of a general
link to commerce that is unnecessaryin all cases.
3. The Role of Congressional Findings-Has the CourtAbandoned the
Rational Basis Standard of Review in Favor of Heightened Judicial
Scrutiny?
In the cases prior to Lopez, the existence of congressional findings
allowed the Court to evaluate whether Congress had a rational basis for
concluding that the activity it sought to regulate had a substantial
1OI. See id.at 561.
102. See id. at 561-62. In United States v. Bass, the government was forced to prove
as an essential element of the criminal offense that the firearm was directly involved in
or affected interstate commerce. 404 U.S. 336, 347-49 (1971).
103. See Lope:, 514 U.S. at 567.
104. 274 U.S. 256(1927).
105. See id. at 258-59.
106. Id. at 259.
107. 392 U.S. 183(1968).
108. See id. at 185-86.
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impact on interstate commerce."l What distinguishes the Gun-Free
School Zones Act from the cases previously discussed is that Congress
made no express findings that the possession of a firearm in a school
zone substantially affected interstate commerce."' This lack of
findings rendered the Court ill-equipped to apply the rational basis test
to the facts of the case.'"
Instead, the Government argued the following potential impacts of
guns in school zones on commerce at trial: possession of firearms at
schools may result in violent crime; this possibility of violent crime
would increase social costs to combat the problem, such as insurance
costs; violent crime decreases interstate travel in perceived unsafe
areas; and guns in schools threaten the educational process and could
thereby result in a less productive national citizenry."2  The Court
rejected these "cost of crime" arguments because they would allow
federal regulation not only of all violent crime, but also of other
activities that potentially lead to violent crime, which would
impermissibly infringe on the police powers as reserved to the states." 3
Significant for the future application of Lopez, however, was that
the government's arguments had no support in the way of express
findings or legislative history, which made it easy for the Act to fail the
rational basis test.'' Instead, the Act required the Court "to pile
inference upon inference" in such a way that would grant Congress the
authority under its commerce power to police the nation, a power
specifically retained by the states in our system of dual sovereignty." '
The Court candidly admitted that previous cases had granted Congress
such policing authority by deferring to congressional enactments, but
the Court declined to take it a step further because to do so would fail
to recognize the long-heralded distinction between national and local
concerns." 6  The Court would not have been forced to make the
aforementioned inferences had Congress made express findings
regarding the link between firearm possession in school zones and
interstate commerce, yet the decision failed to identify the role of
congressional findings in future cases." 7 However, in light of Morrison,
109. See Lopez. 514 U.S. at 563; see also Biden, supra note 52, at 15.
110. See Lopez. 514 U.S. at 562.
Ill. See id. at 563.
112. See id. at 563-64.
113. See id. at 564.
114. See id. at 552.
115. See id. at 567.
116. See Lopez. 514 U.S. at 567-68.
117. See id. at 567.
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even express findings that support congressional action will no longer
sustain the validity of an act if the Court's "independent evaluation""'8
fails to reach the same conclusion.
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. Majority Opinion
In United States v. Morrison,"9 the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and
held that despite extensive legislative findings to the contrary, violence
against women is not an activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce.' The majority opinion began by detailing the provisions
of the VAWA civil rights remedy in 42 U.S.C. § 13981."2'
The civil rights remedy states that "[a]ll persons within the United
States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated
by gender."'22 The enforcement of that right is provided in subsection
(c), which allows a civil cause of action for victims of gender-moti-
vated violent crime.' 23 In order to fall within § 13981's civil rights
remedy, the injured party must show that the crime of violence was
"committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at
118. Seeid. at 562.
119. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
120. See id. at 1752-54. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the 5-4 majority opinion, in
which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. See id. at 1745. Justice
Thomas wrote a concurring opinion. See id. at 1759 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice
Souter filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer
joined. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also wrote a dissenting opinion,
in which Justice Stevens joined in full and Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined as to
Part I-A. See id. at 1774 (Breyer, J., dissenting). [Author's note: The Supreme Court's
grant of certiorari encompassed the constitutionality of the VAWA's civil rights remedy
alone: therefore, this note will not discuss the petitioner's other claims. In addition, the
focus of this note will be on the Court's analysis of the validity of the VAWA under the
Commerce Clause. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.]
12 1. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1747.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b)(1994).
123. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1747. Specifically, § 13981(c) provides:
A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits a crime
of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the right
declared in subsection (b) of this section shall be liable to the party injured,
in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages.
injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem
appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 13981(c)(1994).
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least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender."'2 4 The Court
noted the broad scope of the remedy'25 in that it does not require a prior
criminal charge or conviction to bring a civil suit.'26 Further, §
13981(e)(3) provides victims with a choice of forums: State and
federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the litigation.27
Despite the broad range of criminal activity encompassed in §
13981, Congress did place limitations on the civil rights remedy. 28
The remedy is specifically excluded for random violent acts independ-
ent of gender or for acts that cannot be established, by a preponderance
of the evidence, to be inflamed by gender.'29 And, in an attempt not to
encroach on areas of purely state concern, the federal courts cannot
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any claims dealing with
divorce, alimony, the distribution of marital property, or child
custody.'3
Next, the Court examined whether Congress had authority to enact
§ 13981 under the Commerce Clause,13' a source of authority it
specifically identified when defining the purpose of the VAWA.1'2 At
the outset the Court noted, "[d]ue respect for the decisions of a
coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate a
congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has
exceeded its constitutional bounds."' 3'  However, the Court clearly
expressed its federalism concerns when it stressed that Congress's
regulatory authority over interstate commerce "may not be extended so
as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote
that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectu-
ally obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local
and create acompletely centralized government."'34
The Supreme Court recently addressed the scope of Congress's
authority to enact legislation under the Commerce Clause in United
States v. Lopez.13  As the Court discussed in Lopez, there are three broad
124. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(I)(1994).
125. See Morrison. 120 S. Ct. at 1748.
126. See 42 U.S.C. § 1398 1(e)(2) (1994).
127. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1748; 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(3) (1994).
128. See Morrison. 120 S. Ct. at 1748.
129. See42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(I)(1994).
130. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4) (1994).
13 I. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
132. See Morrison. 120 S. Ct. at 1748: see also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
133. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1748.
134. Id. at 1749 (citing United States v. Lopez. 514 U.S. 549. 556-57 (1995))
(quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
135. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In Lopez, the Supreme Court invalidated the Gun-Free
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categories of activity that Congress has authority to regulate under the
Commerce Clause.'36 At issue in this case, as in Lopez, is the third
category of permissible Commerce Clause regulation: activities that
have a substantial relation to and "substantially affect" interstate
commerce.' 7  Thus, the Court viewed Lopez as the controlling authority
on this issue, and Lopez provided the framework for the Court's
analysis of the VAWA.' 38
The Court recounted their Lopez decision in detail' 39 and ultimately
rejected the petitioners' argument that Congress is empowered to
regulate non-economic violent crime based solely on the aggregate
effects of that crime on interstate commerce. 140  First, the Court
recognized that federal regulation of a purely intrastate activity has
only been sustained when the activity was economic in nature. 4' The
federal criminal statues in Morrison and Lopez, however, did not
regulate commercial or economic activity. 42  Specifically, the VAWA
sought to regulate intrastate violent crime motivated by gender: a non-
economic, "' criminal activity that could not be upheld under Lopez.'"
Second, although Congress expressly found that violence against
women substantially affected interstate commerce,' 4- the Court rejected
the "but-for" causation the petitioners used to reach that conclusion. 46
That line of reasoning could justify federal regulation of "any crime as
School Zones Act of 1990. a federal criminal statute which regulated the possession of
firearms in a school zone, because it exceeded congressional authority to regulate
interstate commerce. See id. at 55 1.
136. See id. at 558. Congress has authority to regulate the following activities under
its commerce power: I) the use of the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the
instrumentalities, persons, or things involved in interstate commerce, even if the
specific subject matter of the regulation is purely intrastate in character; and (3)
activities that have a substantial relation to and substantially affect interstate commerce.
See id. at 558-59.
137. See id. at 559.
138. See Morrison. 120 S. Ct. at 1749.
139. See id. at 1749-53.
140. See id. at 1754.
141. See id. at 1750.
142. See id. at 1750-5 1.
143. See id. at 1751. The majority summarized, "[gender-motivated crimes of
violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity." Id.
144. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 175 1.
145. See id. at 1752. Violence motivated by gender animus affects interstate
commerce "by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in
employment in interstate business, and from transacting with business, and in places
involved in interstate commerce; ... by diminishing national productivity, increasing
medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate




long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial
effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption,"'47 as well
as other areas within the traditional powers of state regulation that have
an equally substantial impact on the national economy. 4  The Court
vehemently stressed that under our federal system, the power to police
the citizenry, suppress crime, and vindicate victims has always been
vested in the states. 9  In the Court's view, giving Congress such
sweeping authority is in direct contradiction of the Constitution and the
purposes of our federal system.'50
Third, § 13981, like the Gun-Free School Zones Act in Lopez, did
not include an express jurisdictional element establishing that the
federal civil rights remedy was in pursuance of Congress's regulation
of interstate commerce. 15  Such a jurisdictional requirement would
have linked a specific gender-motivated act of violence directly to
interstate commerce and might have sustained the VAWA's validity,
but the requirement would have drastically limited the VAWA in
scope. 152  Instead, Congress attempted to regulate a broader category of
crime that was more intrastate in nature, which could not be upheld in
light of the Court's decision in Lopez.'53
Thus, the Court held that the VAWA civil rights remedy was an
unconstitutional exercise of Congress's commerce power and affirmed
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.'54 The Court
concluded, "[i]f the allegations here are true, no civilized system of
justice could fail to provide [Brzonkala] a remedy for the conduct of
respondent Morrison. But under our federal system that remedy must
be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the United
States."' 55
147. Id. at 1752-53.
148. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1753. For example, the majority explained that this
but-for reasoning could equally justify federal regulation of family law, because the
"aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing" are at least as substantial on
the national economy as gender-motivated violence. See id.
149. See id. at 1754.
150. See id.
151. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 175 1.
152. Seeid. at 1751-52.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 1759.
155. Id.
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B. Minority Opinions
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas expressed his view that
the continuing use of the substantial effects test to gauge the constitu-
tionality of a federal regulation under the Commerce Clause is
incompatible with the enumerated powers of Congress in the Constitu-
tion. "'56 He feared that the Court's continued application of the test will
encourage Congress to pass regulations dealing with police powers
"under the guise of regulating commerce."' 57
In contrast, Justice Souter's dissent upheld the VAWA as a valid
exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause authority.' First, the dissent
cited a number of past decisions in which the Court upheld regulation
of activities that only substantially affected interstate commerce in the
aggregate.'59  Echoing the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit panel, the dissent viewed the Court's role in assessing
legislation as supervisory in nature, in that it must uphold a congressio-
nal act if the Congress had a rational basis for its findings."W Justice
Souter, like the panel, would have deferred to the "mountain of data
assembled by Congress" over the course of four years, which proved
that Congress had a rational basis for its conclusion that gender-
motivated violence substantially affects interstate commerce.' 6' In
addition, Justice Souter likened gender-based violence in the 1990s to
racial discrimination in the 1960s, in that it prohibits its victims from
full participation in the national economy. 162  In conclusion, this
dissent criticized the majority's categorical distinctions between the
regulation of economic and non-economic activity, characterizing it as
a revival of an earlier federalism that is out of touch with our modem,
integrated national economy and as ignoring the power of the political
156. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1759 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
157. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
158. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1759 n. I (Souter, J., dissenting).
159. See id. at 1759 (Souter. J., dissenting) (citing Wickard v. Filbum. 317 U.S. I 1l,
124-28 (1942)): Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
277 (1981).
160. See id. at 1760 (Souter, J., dissenting).
161. See id. at 1760-64 (Souter, J.. dissenting). In fact. Congress cited the social
costs of domestic violence alone at between $5 and $10 billion annually. See id. at 1762
(Souter. J., dissenting).
162. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1763 (Souter, J., dissenting): Heart of Atlanta Motel,




process to resolve conflicts between the federal government and the
states. 63
Justice Breyer also filed a dissenting opinion, 164 concerned that the
Court had failed to identify "a set of comprehensible interpretive rules
that courts might use to impose some meaningful limit, but not too
great a limit, upon the scope of the legislative authority that the
Commerce Clause delegates to Congress."'65  He found the distinction
between economic and non-economic activities difficult to apply in
certain situations, which is complicated further by the need for
exceptions.'" Also, as long as the aggregate effects on interstate
commerce are substantial, Justice Breyer saw no need for the major-
ity's focus on the locus in quo of the regulated activity.'16  In addition,
he seemed to view the jurisdictional element that is lacking in the
VAWA as a mere formality: "[l]n a world where most everyday
products or their component parts cross interstate boundaries, Congress
will frequently find it possible to redraft a statute using language that
ties the regulation to the interstate movement of some relevant object,
thereby regulating local criminal activity or, for that matter, family
affairs.' 68
Finally, Justice Breyer agreed with Justice Souter that as long as
the federal regulation passes the rational basis prong of the substantial
effects test, the Congress should remain accountable for striking the
appropriate balance between state and federal power, not the courts.'69
According to Justice Breyer, the passage of the VAWA involved the
cooperation of state and federal governments to address a national
problem, and thus did not encroach on state autonomy."' 'In fact, the
overwhelming majority of state attorneys general supported the
enactment of the VAWA civil rights remedy, stating that: "[T]he
problem of violence against women is a national one, requiring federal
attention, federal leadership, and federal funds.""' Thus, Justice
Breyer also supported the continued application of the traditional
163. See Morrison. 120 S. Ct. at 1770-73 (Souter. J., dissenting).
164. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1774 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
165. Id. (Breyer. J.. dissenting).
166. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). For example, the Court would allow Congress
to "regulate 'non-economic' activity taking place at commercial establishments." Id.
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
167. See id. at 1775 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 1776 (Breyer. J., dissenting).
169. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1776 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
170. See id at 1777 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (Breyer, .. dissenting).
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"rational basis" approach when evaluating federal regulations.' in
light of the extensive congressional findings that violence against
women substantially affects interstate commerce, Justice Breyer argued
that the VAWA is well within Congress's authority under the Com-
merce Clause.'73
V. SIGNIFICANCE
By invalidating the Civil Rights Remedy of the VAWA as an
unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority under the Com-
merce Clause, the Supreme Court shifted the delicate federal balance
in favor of a heightened judicial review of Congress's actions. Prior to
the Court's decision in Morrison, the strength of the rational basis
standard of review withstood Commerce Clause challenges when
Congress rationally concluded that a regulated activity substantially
affected interstate commerce. This principle remained unscathed in the
wake of United States v. Lopez, 74 and rendered the Morrison decision a
surprising break from past precedent when the Court rejected four
years of congressional hearings as a rational basis for passing the
VAWA. Instead, the Court summarily rejected the well-considered
legislation and essentially repudiated the rational basis test for the
limitations on congressional Commerce Clause authority.
The significance of the Morrison decision is multi-faceted. One
aspect of its significance is that the long-standing presumption that the
federal government has special power, and indeed a responsibility, to
regulate matters of discrimination and civil rights has been questioned
by the Morrison decision with its emphasis on new federalism
doctrine.'75 As Duke University Professor Walter Dellinger said, "it
takes away Congress's ability to deal with state inaction, state under-
enforcement, state racial- or gender-based failure to protect the people
from legal violations" by creating a federal remedy. 76 Senator Joseph
Biden, the chief sponsor of the VAWA, expressed astonishment that
the Court has so severely limited Congress's regulatory powers by
172. See id. at 1778 (Breyer. J.. dissenting).
173. See id at 1777-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
174. 514 U.S. 549(1995).
175. See generally David G. Savage, High Court Rejects US. Law Allowing Civil Suits
in Rapes Ruling: Justices Decide, 5 to 4, that Congress Overstepped Its Authority in Allowing
Victims to Sue. Action Appears to Doom Other Federal Hate-crimes Statutes, L.A. TIMES,
May 16. 2000. atAl.
176. All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast. May 15, 2000),
available in 2000 WL 21469056.
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restricting Commerce Clause legislation to economic activity that
affects interstate commerce.' Of course, future application of the
economic/non-economic approach is destined to rely heavily on the
Court's interpretation of exactly what "economic in nature" means,'7"
a malleable standard that is sure to evade the legal community for years
to come. It is ironic that the states, which bear the economic and other
harm resulting from violence against women, overwhelmingly
supported the Civil Rights Remedy, and yet the Court forced them to
tackle the problem alone with an enlivened states' rights approach to
federal power. '79
The ruling also could impact existing and proposed federal laws
in areas such as the environment, hate-crimes prevention and enforce-
ment, and education.' For example, the decision questions the
eventual constitutional validity of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act,
which would amend the federal hate crimes statute'' to include gender,
sexual orientation, and disability with the existing protected classes of
race, national origin, color, and religion.' 2 The decision is especially
alarming in states such as Arkansas that have failed to enact bias-
related or hate-crime laws protecting victims' civil rights, despite the
occurrence of many bias and hate crimes in those states.8 3 In our state,
bias and hate-crime laws are long overdue.
Also significant is that the decision reinforces the feminist legal
theorists' viewpoint that the federal court system is biased in itself by
imposing perfunctory distinctions between federal and state jurisdiction
that leave federal judges powerless to address traditional women's
issues.'s4 The failure to recognize bias-motivated crimes like domestic
177. See id.
178. See Herman Schwartz. Supreme Court Assault on Federalism Swipes at Women,
L.A. TIMES. May 21. 2000, at M I.
179. See Peter M. Shane, In Whose Best Interest? Not the States'. WASH. POST, May 21,
2000. at B5.
180. See Jan Crawford Greenburg. High Court Ruling Further Clips the Role of
Congress, CHi. TRIB.. May 16. 2000, at 1.
181. 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1994).
182. See Goldscheid, supra note 3, at 124. The United States Senate approved the
Act by a 57-42 vote on June 20, 2000. See Tom Raum, Senate OKs Measure on Bias-
Related Crimes: Critics: Bill Infringes on State, Local Power, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, June
21, 2000, at 2A.
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violence, rape, and sexual assault as discriminatory civil rights
violations is just one more example of the federal courts' disinterest in
women's issues, shielded under the rubric of limited federal jurisdic-
tion. s'
Finally, the most basic impact of Morrison is that it deprives the
victims of gender-motivated violence of pursuing a civil remedy in
federal court. As Christy Brzonkala argued in Morrison, this decision
will substantially reduce the number of attackers who are brought to
justice because the states admittedly lack funds and other resources to
pursue these claims with fairness and vigor. Any future attempts by
Congress to regulate bias or hate crimes, or any other purely non-
economic, intrastate activity, will be struck down under Morrison unless
the ideological composition of the Court changes and the Court is
willing to reevaluate its holding here. With the recent election of
former Texas Governor George W. Bush to the American presidency,
any new appointees to the Court will finally solidify the Morrison
majority, and future interpretations of this decision will most likely
follow the Chief Justice's lead. Thus, it is imperative that the states
take an active role in protecting the civil rights of all of their citizens.
After Morrison, Congress is powerless to set the national standard
under the Commerce Clause.
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